We consider the revenue maximization problem of a monopolist via a non-Myersonian approach that could generalize to multiple items and multiple buyers. Although such an approach does not lead to any closed-form solution of the problem, it does provide some insights to this problem from different angles. In particular, we consider both Bayesian (Bayesian Incentive Compatible + Bayesian Individually Rational) and Dominant-Strategy (Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatible + ex-post Individually Rational) implementations, where all the buyers have additive valuations and quasi-linear utilities and all the valuations are independent across buyers (not necessarily independent across items).
Introduction
Roadmap We introduce our notations and the common definitions in Section 2. We apply the dual analysis and define virtual values in Section 3. In Section 4 we present our main characterization and we then show that in Section 5 for the i.i.d. se ing, such a charaterization implies that DSIC = BIC if and only if separate-selling is optimal.
Notations
roughout this manuscript, we use subscripts i to indicate buyers and superscripts j to indicate items. We also use boldface (without subscript) notations for vectors across all the buyers (e.g., matrices for allocation x and value v while vectors for payments p) and notations without superscripts (but with subscripts) for vectors across all the items for some certain buyer (e.g., allocation x i and value v i of buyer i, while both are vectors). As a general convention, we use subscripts −i for the vectors without the element(s) for buyer i and [n] = 1, . . . , n for the set of buyers and [m] = 1, . . . , m for the set of items. We also use · to emphasize the inner product of between two vectors.
As we will consider both Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementations, we use variables withf or Bayesian implementations (e.g.,x i (v) andp i (v)) while those without¯for dominant-strategy implementations (e.g., x i (v) and p i (v)).
We consider the case where the buyers have independent values with each other (yet the values of the same buyer for different items might be correlated).
e values are additive and the utilities are quasilinear. We will formalize the definitions later.
For ease of using linear programs, we consider discrete distributions with finite supports. 3
Direct Auctions
A direct auction M = x, p consists of the allocation x : R n×m + → [0, 1] n×m and the payment p : R n×m
+ . e utility of each buyer i is
For any value profile v ∈ R n×m + , the allocation and payment must satisfy the following feasibility constraint, ∀ j ∈ [m], v ∈ R n×m
We use µ to denote the probability measure of the common prior knowledge on the private values. In particular, since the values are independent across buyers, µ(v) can be wri en as
Let V i ⊆ R m + be any finite support of the prior distribution of buyer i, namely,
In particular, we will assume that ∀v i 0, µ i (v i ) > 0 to simplify the discussion of corner cases.
Similarly, we have the following linear program for optimal dominant-strategy direct mechanisms:
Again, any feasible solution to this linear program is only a limited dominant-strategy implementation, while the following lemma (first by Dobzinski et al. [2011] ) provides an extension method similar to the Bayesian case.
Lemma 2.2 (Dominant-Strategy Extension). Given any feasible solution (x, p) to DSLP, the extended direct mechanism (x ′ , p ′ ) defined as follows satisfies DSIC and epIR.
where
erefore, from now on, we will only focus on the value space V.
Separate Selling
By separate-selling, we mean to sell each of the item independently via the Myerson's auction. We use SR to denote the revenue of separate-selling.
Dual Programs and Virtual Values
Now we write down the corresponding dual programs. In particular, we will omit the "for-all" quantifiers on the free variables in the rest of the paper.
Dominant-Strategy Implementation

Duality and Complementary Slackness
First for dominant-strategy implementation, let
, and ξ j (v) be the corresponding multipliers of the constraints. By reorganizing DSLP into the standard form, we obtain, Primal Dominant-Strategy
Hence the dual program is Dual Dominant-Strategy
We then use P to denote the polytope of all feasible solutions of the primal linear program, and similarly D for the polytope of the dual linear program. For ease of notation, we use the following abbreviations:
en the primal and dual look like
Clearly, both P and D are always nonempty, and P is bounded. Now, suppose π * = x * j i (v), p * i (v) ∈ P is an optimal solution of the primal, and
is an optimal solution of the dual. By strong duality theorem, we know that obj(π * ) = obj(δ * ), which is the optimal revenue of any dominant-strategy implementation, denoted by DR :
Finally, we add slack variables to both primal and dual:
In what follows, we will abuse the notation P and D as the feasible polytopes for both normal variables and slack variables for primal and dual, respectively.
Complementary Slackness For any feasible primal solution π ∈ P and dual solution δ ∈ D, they are the optimal solution for primal and dual if and only if:
In particular, the gap between primal and dual objectives equals the sum of all the products.
We then focus on interpreting the complementary slackness conditions.
Virtual Values
For any fixed optimal solutions π * ∈ P and δ * ∈ D, since α * j i (v)x * j i (v) = 0, we conclude that:
In particular, it also implies that item j is only allocated to the buyer(s) i with maximum φ * j i (v):
where the inequality is the first constraint of the dual program (
which implies that item j is not fully allocated only if for all buyer i ′ , φ * j i ′ (v) is not strictly positive.
Definition 3.1 (Expected Virtual Values). For any optimal dual solution δ * , φ * j i (v) defines the expected virtual values in the sense that any optimal auction must maximize the expected virtual welfare.
Note that the expected virtual values are different from the virtual values commonly used in revenue maximization literatures. For example, virtual values are not always well-defined for some extreme cases (such as discrete/unbounded distributions and distributions with point masses), while the expected virtual values are always explicitly defined by an dual optimal solution. Later in eorem 3.2, we will formally define the virtual values in our se ing as analog to common virtual values (e.g., Myerson's virtual value). eorem 3.2 (Virtual Values). For any optimal dual solution δ * satisfying certain regularization conditions (defined later), there exists corresponding virtual value functions ϕ
In particular,
Moreover, any optimal auction (optimal primal solution) π * must be a virtual welfare maximizer:
1. Each item is only allocated to the buyer(s) with the highest and non-negative virtual value on this item;
2. e highest virtual value for any unallocated (or partially allocated) item must be non-positive (for partially allocated items, the highest virtual value must be zero).
e basic idea is to simply define ϕ
, while it only works when µ(v) > 0. For those v ∈ V such that µ(v) = 0, the virtual value ϕ j i (v) can be defined only if φ * j i (v) = 0 as well. Hence the first regularization condition is:
Besides, we will require two more regularization conditions to simplify the discussion in upcoming sections, which are:
By our previous interpretations on some of the complementary slackness conditions, we remain to prove the following lemma: Lemma 3.3 (Regular Dual OPT). ere always exists an optimal dual solution δ * satisfying the regularization condition (1), (2), and (3). 4 Proof of eorem 3.2. Directly implied by Lemma 3.3.
Furthermore, by Lemma 3.3, we can reformulate φ * j i (v) as follows,
3.2 Bayesian Implementation
Duality and Complementary Slackness
Now, for Bayesian implementation,
be the corresponding multipliers of the constraints. By reorganizing BLP into the standard form, we obtain, Primal Bayesian
Hence the dual program is Dual Bayesian
Similarly, we then useP to denote the polytope of all feasible solutions of the Bayesian primal linear program,D for the polytope of the Bayesian dual linear program, and the following abbreviations:
Clearly, bothP andD are always nonempty, andP is bounded. Now, supposeπ
∈D is an optimal solution of the dual. By strong duality theorem, we know that obj(π * ) = obj(δ * ), which is the optimal revenue of any Bayesian implementation, denoted by BR :
Again, we add slack variables to both primal and dual:
As we did for dominant-strategy implementation, we will abuse the notationP andD as the feasible polytopes for both normal variables and slack variables of primal and dual, respectively.
Complementary Slackness For any feasible primal solutionπ ∈P and dual solutionδ ∈D, they are the optimal solution for primal and dual if and only if:
(Bayesian) Virtual Values
We then repeat the interpreting of the complementary slackness conditions as we did for the dominantstrategy implementation. In particular, we can conclude that µ −i (v −i )φ * j i (v) is the expected virtual value in Bayesian se ing:
Definition 3.4 (Expected (Bayesian) Virtual Values). For any optimal dual solutionδ * , µ −i (v −i )φ * j i (v) defines the expected (Bayesian) virtual values in the sense that any optimal auction must maximize the expected virtual welfare.
Similarly, we can define virtual values for Bayesian implementations. eorem 3.5 ((Baysian) Virtual Values). For any optimal dual solutionδ * satisfying certain regularization conditions (defined later), there exists corresponding virtual value functionsφ
Moreover, any optimal auction (optimal primal solution)π * must be a virtual welfare maximizer:
e corresponding regularization conditions are as follows:
By our previous interpretations on some of the complementary slackness conditions, we remain to prove the following lemma: Lemma 3.6 (Regular Dual OPT). ere always exists an optimal dual solution δ * satisfying the regularization condition (4), (5), and (6). 5 Proof of eorem 3.5. Directly implied by Lemma 3.6.
Furthermore, by Lemma 3.6, we can reformulateφ * j i (v i ) as follows,
Characterization
In this section, we present the sufficient and necessary characterization of BIC = DSIC.
A sufficient and necessary condition of BIC = DSIC
In previous sections, we defined two types of virtual values, i.e., dominant-strategy virtual values (DSVV) and Bayesian virtual values (BVV). In particular, the Bayesian virtual values for buyer i,φ 
(AI) en our first main result is the following characterization: eorem 4.1. BIC = DSIC if and only if that there is an optimal DSIC auction that is induced by agentindependent virtual values.
Proof of eorem 4.1. "=⇒":
One key observation is that any solution of Dual BLP induces a solution of Dual DSLP. In particular,
∈D be an optimal solution to Dual BLP. e followingδ constructed fromδ * is a feasible solution to Dual DSLP:δ
We omit the verification ofδ ∈ D, which is directly implied by the definition of Dual BLP and Dual DSLP (as well as the fact that µ −i (v −i ) ≥ 0).
In the meanwhile, note that the objective value ofδ * in Dual BLP is the same as the objective value of δ in Dual DSLP, we conclude that:
where δ * is an optimal solution of Dual DSLP and the last inequality is from the optimality of δ * .
On the other hand, by the hypothesis that BIC = DSIC, i.e., obj(δ * ) = obj(δ * ), the constructed solution δ is in fact an optimal solution to Dual DSLP.
Sinceδ * is an arbitrary optimal solution to Dual BLP, we can further assume that it is regular (Lemma 3.6). e correspondingδ then is also regular according to the definition in Lemma 3.3 (we omit the verification here, which is straightforward by the definitions). erefore,δ defines the virtual values for an optimal DSIC auction (DSVV):φ
In particular, the virtual values are the same as (BVV) and are agent-independent.
By the hypothesis that there exist agent-independent virtual values δ
inducing an optimal DSIC auction, we can construct the followingδ, which is a feasible solution to Dual BLP:δ
Note that according to the definiton of agent-independence (AI), the construction ofδ is consistent for all v −i . In particular, if µ −i (v −i ) = 0, for all v ′ −i ∈ V −i , by (AI),
Hence in such special cases, we can safely defineζ i (v ′ i , v i ) = 0 and similarlyη i (v i ) = 0. In the meanwhile, such a construction ensures that (i) its objective value in BLP being the same as the objective value of δ * in DSLP obj(δ) = obj(δ * ), and (ii)δ is also a feasible solution to Dual BLP (we omit the further verification here, which is straightforward by the definitions)
erefore, we conclude that DSIC = BIC:
whereδ * is any optimal solution to Dual BLP and the last inequality is due to the fact that BIC ≥ DSIC.
e I.I.D. Setting
In this section, we further show that if the value distributions are i.i.d. and 0 is in the supports, then the previous characterization implies that DR = SR . In the meanwhile, since separate selling employees agent-independent virtual values, DR = SR directly implies that BR = DR = SR . In other words, although BR ≥ DR ≥ SR in general, any two of them being equal implies that all of them are equal:
Corollary 5.1. For n ≥ 3,
In fact, we have the following theorem:
eorem 5.2. In the i.i.d. value se ing with n ≥ 3, if the optimal DSIC auction is induced by agentindependent virtual values, there exist item-independent (and agent-independent) virtual values inducing an optimal DSIC auction.
e agent-independent virtual values are called item-independent, if
In particular, Corollary 5.1 directly follows from eorem 5.2:
• if virtual value ϕ j i is restricted to depending on v j i only, separate selling via Myerson's auction would be the optimal (hence BR = DR =⇒ BR = DR = SR );
• if DR = SR , then the optimal DSIC auction can be induced by agent-and item-independent virtual values, implying DSIC = BIC (hence DR = SR =⇒ BR = DR = SR );
• if SR = BR , then by BR ≥ DR ≥ SR , all of them must be equal (hence SR = BR =⇒ BR = DR = SR ).
We then move to the proof of eorem 5.2, which relies on the following lemma:
. Proof of eorem 5.2. We prove by contradiction. Assume that the virtual values are not item-independent. Note that the valuations are i.i.d., hence, without loss of generality, we assume that the virtual values for the agents are the same and the allocations are symmetric. Hence we also omit the subscripts of virtual values throught the proof.
In particular, letv j denote the maximum value of the j-th item in the support and v j 0 denote the value profile with all maximum value except that the value of the j-th item being 0: en consider the two cases where v i is either v or v (−j) .
• In both cases, the allocations of item j ′ j won't change, because either item j ′ is always allocated to buyer i ′ or always allocated uniformly at random.
• v i = v. In this case, all the buyers except i ′ have the same value and hence the same allocation. In particular, they will get 1/(n − 1) of item j.
• v i = v (−j) . In this case, according to the assumption (7), buyer i has the highest (positive) virtual value on item j and will be allocated the entire item. To ensure that buyer i in this case won't have incentive to misreport her values as v, she will be charged v j i (n−2)/(n−1) for the extra (n−2)/(n−1) fraction of item j comparing with the previous case.
Given the previous analysis, if buyer i has any value v ′ with v ′ j i > v 
Missing Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.3. For condition (1), if µ −i (v −i ) = 0, then µ(v) = 0, and we can simply let
By doing so, δ * is still a feasible solution to the dual program, and the objective value does not change. Hence the optimality is preserved. Moreover,
